

### PCV Central Committee Declares Party Ready to Use Any Means For Victory

During a meeting of the Central Committee of the PCV held from 6 to 9 December, party chiefs agreed that militants must be prepared to use any and all forms of struggle necessary to achieve national liberation and to take over the government. The plenum ratified the conclusions of the Third Party Congress in regard to the feasibility of a peaceful rise to power; it was stated that the Venezuelan Revolution does not depend on the wishes of the people but on the attitude of the imperialists and the dominant class, which unfortunately, have clearly demonstrated their intention of not committing the people to win their freedom peacefully. Party chiefs stated that while the ideal was to achieve free and clean elections in Venezuela, such would not be possible as long as the country had a government which was incapable of respecting the rights of the citizens, which suppressed certain political organizations and which practiced political arrests and persecutions.

It was voted to send greetings and a statement of solidarity to all political prisoners, especially to Deputy Eloy Torres, a member of the PCV Central Committee Politburo, and to the Cuban ORI and to Fidel Castro.

A special commission was appointed to make a report on ideological problems of international Communism, and it was also agreed to call upon fraternal parties to resolve these problems within the Communist brotherhood and to continue to adhere to the principles of proletarian internationalism. -- Report released by the propaganda committee of the PCV (Caracas, Tribuna Popular, 18 Dec 62)

### Government Official Releases Secret PCV Document Calling For Continued Guerrilla Warfare

At a recent press conference, Acting Minister of Internal Affairs Alejandro Oropeza Castillo stated that the government has in its possession documents revealing the insincerity of the announced appeasement policy of the PCV and the MIR. The Minister said that the reported appeasement policy was only a tactical maneuver in the unceasing struggle of the extremists to overthrow the Constitutional Government, and that by this maneuver, the extremists hope to put the democratic sectors and in the people in general off their guard. To demonstrate his point, the Minister read segments from the documents of the recent clandestine meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. These excerpts, which were to be used in the legal battle to outlaw the PCV and the MIR, are as follows: ("The crisis in which Venezuela find itself entails the destruction of the present production relationships...it is a matter of basic truth which will be demonstrated if the method chosen by the revolutionary forces can be adjusted to the particular historical moment...since it is a matter of the realization of wishes rather than an objective reality, all activities appear pyrotechnical and adventuristic...but there can be no doubt.

"The existence of a strong non-revolutionary opposition represents a problem whose greater danger is to fall into a policy of alliances, a game of subtleties and nuances, which would sterilize the revolutionary movement...but the very fact that the government of Betancourt finds itself face to face with heterogeneous forces does not mean that the error of 23 January must be repeated...it is outlined in the revolution that a political and military instrument is necessary...the method selected includes the struggle against Betancourt. This fact encompasses more sectors than those interested in revolution. Therefore, the integration of a front in which hegemony is exercised by the revolutionary forces is necessitated...the methods outlined pass along an entire action spectrum from coup d'etat to revolution. Nor is the electoral process ruled out. However, no method which involves political and material disarmament of the revolutionary forces is admissible.... Let no one deceive himself. Romulo Betancourt is one goal along a long road, an incident....

"The struggle presents two alternatives...a rapid military victory or a prolonged war. For the first, decisive garrisons are needed...this is only a dream since we are beset by lack of men under arms, a shortage of weapons and no easy means of acquiring them, and great problems of logistics...therefore, a political structure which will unite separated groups becomes a necessity...this structure will have as its military arm the FALN...this divests the struggle of its 'Communist' character...there will probably be internal classes afterwards, but the experience of Cuba and Algiers shows that the revolutionary forces can be expected to come out on top...this front needs a plan of action which abolished isolated activity...Puerto Cabello and Carupano show the irresponsible and adventuristic form in which we have played with insurrection. As Lenin said, one cannot make a game of an uprising...rash attempts at insurrection should not leave loose ends...the plan should have as its first base the guerrilla bands, both urban and rural. These latter are a peculiar reality of the revolutionary struggle in Venezuela...but for now, there is ample margin for a civic battle, even for us...

"Liberation has three stages: A strategic offensive on the part of the enemy, countered by our own defensive tactic in the guerrilla bands; a stage of transition which can be pushed until it becomes a war of maneuvers; and the final stage, in which we undertake the strategic offensive...it will be a serious and prolonged war....

"Within the party are two sectors, one which is hard working and a second which vacillates...of the 80 members of the Central Committee, only one is a guerrilla, two were leaders in Carupano and Puerto Cabello, and there are not more than ten who work in those places where they are needed. There is a lack of mysticism...the majority show only marginal enthusiasm...there are too many members of the Politburo in Carracas...but within the opportunistic stagnation and political and ideological mediocrity which has entrapped the Communist Parties of the non-socialist world, we are an example...but we must be careful of the cry babies, who are always ready to say: I know it, I told them not to do that....

"On the other hand, we must continue to talk among ourselves on matters regarding government...it is agreed that support and such a thing is not at all certain. To the contrary,

economically and militarily, the present government is backed by the most powerful and largest sectors of those who participate in national politics ...It is also incorrect to confuse the present crisis with the final crisis...remember the mistake of 1962, when it was believed that on 2 March, upon the inauguration of Congress, the disseminative crisis could be produced...effecting this factor are the non-revolutionary tendencies of the URD and the ARS...if the URD and the ARS were truly revolutionary parties, a political crisis of incalculable consequences would have been created, since we would have been in a position to elect a delegate commission controlled by the opposition...therefore, there would have been no agreement, there would have been no delegate commission, and the executive would never have been legalized.... But what actually happened was that a delegate commission was composed of forces such that the government and the opposition were at a draw, subject to the decisions of an 'arbitrator' who always voted with the government parties in major decisions...

"The electoral process has contributed to the electoral illusions of the people...elections contribute to the maintenance of government stability and have slowed the march of the armed revolution...if the government should act in an impertinent manner, the imperialists and the oligarchy would respond with a coup d'etat according to the Peruvian formula or perhaps utilizing the URD and the ARS.... If, as if possible, the government behaved itself, the 'constitutionalists' will be encouraged... in any case, the great opportunity for revolution in Venezuela will occur at the combination of the electoral campaign...it would be stupid on our part to attend any revolutionary action for this time; we would fail and possibly we would retard the maturation of objectives conditions necessary for revolutionary action...." (Carracas, El Nacional, 25 Feb 63)